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COMMENTS
A SURVEY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES TO MUNICIPAL REGULATION
OF RELIGIOUS SOLICITATION AND A
SUGGESTED LEGISLATIVE COMPROMISE
I. Introduction
Solicitations may be commercial, charitable, religious, political, or
educational in nature. Solicitation is often undertaken to provide
information to the public.' Yet, overly zealous solicitors may create an
annoyance to the general public. 2 Thus, municipalities have passed a
variety of ordinances to regulate solicitations. The most common
ordinances are those which require written permission to solicit and
4
distribute literature, 3 and those which impose an area limitation.
1. Jones, Solicitation-Charitableand Religious, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 53 (1979)
(discussing distinction between religious and charitable solicitations). This Comment
deals primarily with religious solicitation.
2. This observation was made by the court in International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness (ISKCON) of Houston, Inc. v. City of Houston, 689 F.2d 541, 543
(5th Cir. 1982).
3. See Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1981) (statute prohibiting
charitable organization from soliciting funds on airport premises without first applying for and obtaining permit found unconstitutional), cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 5
(1982); Conlon v. City of N. Kansas City, Mo., 530 F. Supp. 985 (W.D. Mo. 1981)
(regulation prohibiting solicitation within city without permit or certificate of registration from city clerk found unconstitutional); McMurdie v. Doutt, 468 F. Supp.
766 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (ordinance requiring solicitors to procure license from mayor
before soliciting in city found unconstitutional); ISKCON, Inc. v. Lentini, 461 F.
Supp. 49 (E.D. La. 1978) (city ordinance requiring that solicitor obtain permit and
be licensed to solicit in the city found unconstitutional); ISKCON of Berkeley, Inc. v.
Kearnes, 454 F. Supp. 116 (E.D. Cal. 1978) (ordinances requiring solicitors to obtain
permits before soliciting in city or county found unconstitutional); Smith v. City of
Manchester, 460 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (municipal code absolutely prohibiting solicitation of funds for religious purposes unless solicitor obtained permit from
city recorder found unconsitutional); ISKCON, Inc. v. Wolke, 453 F. Supp. 869
(E.D. Wis. 1978) (county ordinance requiring solicitors to first obtain written permission from airport director found unconstitutional); ISKCON, Inc. v. Hays, 438 F.
Supp. 1077 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (regulation prohibiting solicitation on turnpike system
without written permission of Department of Transportation found unconstitutional); ISKCON, Inc. v. Engelhardt, 425 F. Supp. 176 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (ordinances requiring issuance of airport director's written permission for solicitation
found unconstitutional).
4. Heffron v. ISKCON, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (rule limiting sale, exhibition,
or distribution of materials during state fair to fixed locations on fairgrounds found
constitutional); Hynes v. Metropolitan Gov't, 667 F.2d 549 (6th Cir. 1982) (per
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Recently, these ordinances have given rise to massive litigation, 5 involving challenges under the first and fourteenth amendments.
Solicitation encompasses various forms of speech interests, and enjoys the protection of the first amendment. 6 However, solicitation
does not enjoy unlimited constitutional protection. Reasonable regulations to safeguard governmental interests in protecting citizens from
abusive practices in the solicitation of funds are permitted. 7 Thus, the
courts must balance governmental interests against the first amendment rights of religious solicitors. Different types of solicitation, however, are not afforded the same constitutional protection.8 Religious

curiam) (state fair rule prohibiting literature distribution and solicitation of funds on
fairgrounds except in booths found constitutional); Edwards v. Maryland State Fair
& Agricultural Soc'y, Inc., 628 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1980) (rule requiring those wishing
to solicit contributions at state fair to do so from booth found unconstitutional);
ISKCON, Inc. v. Bowen, 600 F.2d 667 (7th Cir.) (defendant fair officials enjoined
from restricting ISKCON members' practice of Sankirtan to booths), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 963 (1979); ISKCON v. State Fair of Tex., 480 F. Supp. 67 (N.D. Tex.
1979) (regulations attempting to geographically restrict plaintiffs' free circulation
through state fair found unconstitutional); ISKCON, Inc. v. Evans, 440 F. Supp. 414
(S.D. Ohio 1977) (regulations requiring that solicitations be made from within booth
or display found constitutional).
5. Primarily, this Comment will focus on the religious solicitation of two currently controversial religious groups: the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISKCON) and the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of
World Christianity (the Unification Church). The vast majority of cases challenging
the regulation of religious solicitation have been brought by ISKCON. "In the last
decade [ISKCON] has started about 100 court cases to gain access to airports,
fairgrounds, zoos and Federal buildings ....."Press, Hare Krishnas in the Dock,
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 29, 1980, at 83. Key in understanding what appears to be a love of
litigation on ISKCON's part is its requirement that devotees perform Sankirtan, a
religious ritual meant to "spread the religion's truths through solicitation of contributions, dissemination of religious tracts, and sale of religious materials." ISKCON,
Inc. v. Rochford, 425 F. Supp. 734, 736 (N.D. Ill. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
585 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1978). Areas with high concentrations of people are thus
prime targets for the practice of Sankirtan.
Similarly, "the [Unification] Church's activities include public-place and door-todoor proselytizing of its tenets and principles, and the distribution of religious literature, frequently accompanied by the solicitation of funds from the public for the
support of the church." Conlon v. City of N. Kansas City, Mo., 530 F. Supp. 985,
986 (W.D. Mo. 1981).
6. See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 639
(1980) (solicitation constitutes protected speech); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940) (first amendment guarantees freedom to act on religious beliefs).
7. Larson v. Valente, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 1685 (1982) (statute imposing percentage
requirements on religious solicitation found unconstitutional).
8. See Weissman v. City of Alamogordo, 472 F. Supp. 425 (D.N.M. 1979). The
municipal ordinances at issue in the case prohibited door to door solicitation without
distinguishing between commercial and non-commercial solicitation. The court
found that such a distinction was necessary in light of the Supreme Court's repeated
holding that religious or non-commercial door-to-door solicitation cannot be prohib-
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solicitation enjoys the additional protection of the establishment and
free exercise clauses of the first amendment. 9 By contrast, commercial
solicitation may be regulated more extensively.l°
There are certain well-defined boundaries which the courts have
placed on religious solicitation. For example, with the exception of
door-to-door solicitation, soliciting on private property may be strictly
prohibited." Reasonable time, place or manner restrictions also may
be imposed. 12 Considerable controversy has arisen concerning what
constitutes private property 3 and what restrictions are reasonable. 14
As a result, the differing interpretations of the permissible limitations
upon religious solicitation which courts have offered may give rise to
discrimination.
The usual presumption of legislative validity does not apply to
governmental regulation of religious fundraising in public places. The
government must establish the validity of its ordinance. 5 Most plainited constitutionally by a Green River ordinance. Id. at 428. For a definition and
detailed discussion of Green River ordinances, see Reynolds, "Green River Ordinances": Where Does the Burden Belong?, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 427 (1983).
9. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. 1673, 1689 (1982); Cantwell v. Connecticut,

310 U.S. 296 (1940).
10. See United States v. Silberman, 464 F. Supp. 866 (M.D. Fla. 1979). "On the
one hand, despite the fact that it may include distribution, sales, and solicitations,
the exercise and practice of religious belief is a freedom guaranteed by the First
Amendment. On the other hand, purely commercial activity does not enjoy the same
kind of protection." Id. at 871. An additional comparison may be made between
charitable and religious solicitation. According to this distinction, the first amendment's added protection of religious solicitation might not extend to charitable
solicitation. While "an ordinance designed to regulate charitable solicitations carries
a presumption of reasonableness and constitutionality, . . .a regulation imposed
upon religious solicitations must overcome a presumption against such legislation."
Jones, supra note 1, at 60.
11. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 619 (1976) (no absolute right to
enter on private premises for any purpose); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976)
(employees had no first amendment right to picket private shopping center); Lloyd
Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (Court refused to extend first amendment
protection to plaintiffs where private shopping mall was surrounded by public
streets, speech was unrelated to purposes of mall, and mall prohibited all handbilling); ISKCON v. Reber, 454 F. Supp. 1385 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (solicitation and
proselytizing could be prohibited on street which appeared to be public but was
actually privately owned).
12. Heffron v. ISKCON, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981) (restrictions permissible
if they serve substantial state interest); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451
(1937) (restrictions permissible if limited in scope).
13. See notes 151-53 infra and accompanying text.
14. See notes 209-11 infra and accompanying text.
15. See ISKCON, Inc. v. Rochford, 585 F.2d 263, 270 (7th Cir. 1978) ("a
regulation which restricts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms bears a heavy

presumption against its validity .. ."). See also B.

SCHWARTZ,

CONSTITUTIONAL

312-13 (2d ed. 1979) (burden on government, not on individual attacking
restriction).
LAW
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tiffs challenge ordinances regulating religious solicitation on fourteenth amendment due process grounds. 8 Ordinances commonly are
attacked for being overly broad or vague.17 Ordinances also may be
attacked under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. "'8 In such cases, it is incumbent upon the state to justify its
ordinance by demonstrating a compelling interest which necessitates
the particular form of regulation imposed.'
The recent increase in challenges to municipal regulation of religious solicitation indicates a need for legislation which will survive
judicial scrutiny. Such legislation must protect both governmental
interests and the first amendment rights of religious solicitors.
This Comment will discuss the historical framework in which religious solicitation cases have arisen. Next, the recent trend in lower
courts' interpretations of the permissible scope of municipal regulation
of religious solicitation will be examined. Finally, this Comment concludes by setting forth a model ordinance by which municipalities can
regulate religious solicitation to afford maximum protection to their
citizens and to the constitutional rights of religious solicitors.
II. Historical Background: Supreme Court Interpretations
A. Public Distribution of Literature
The first legal battles against municipal regulation of religious solicitation were fought by Jehovah's Witnesses in the Supreme Court over
2
forty years ago. 20 The first of these cases, Lovell v. City of Griffin
involved a municipal ordinance that prohibited the distribution of
literature without prior permission from a city official.22 The Court
16. Jones, supra note 1, at 53. The due process clause prohibits the states from
depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
17. See notes 68-79 infra and accompanying text. Plaintiffs generally allege that
an overly broad or vague ordinance vests too much discretion in the governmental
authority who is interpreting the ordinance. See notes 80-88 infra and accompanying
text.
18. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws," U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
19. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. 1673, 1684-85 (1982).
20. One writer has referred to ISKCON devotees as "the legal heirs to the battles
won by the Jehovah's Witnesses 40 years ago." Press, supra note 5, at 83.
21. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
22. Id. at 447-48. The ordinance provided:
§ 1. That the practice of distributing, either by hand or otherwise, circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind, whether said
articles are being delivered free, or whether same are being sold,
within the limits of the city of Griffin, without first obtaining written
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invalidated the ordinance, finding it to be the antithesis of a reasonthat
able time, place and manner restriction. 23 The Court emphasized
24
censorship.
to
amount
effectively
the ordinance would
Four municipal ordinances at issue in Schneider v. State25 were also
found to be unreasonable restrictions upon public distribution of literature.26 Three of the ordinances absolutely prohibited distribution on
public streets.2 7 The Court found that the purpose of the prohibition,
to keep the streets clean and attractive, was an insufficient justification. 28 The fourth ordinance required a license for door-to-door solicitation and permitted a police officer to determine the extent of the
distribution.2 9 This "censorship through license" was held unconstitutional. 30 Moreover, the Court stated that it was inappropriate to
attempt to combat fraudulent solicitation through the use of police
31
discretion.
B. Administrative Discretion, Licensing Fees and Denial
of a Public Forum
A similar overly generous grant of governmental discretion
prompted the Court's objection in Cantwell v. Connecticut.32 In

permission from the City Manager of the City of Griffin, such practice shall be deemed a nuisance, and punishable as an offense against
the City of Griffin.
§ 2. The Chief of Police . . . and the police force of the City . .. are
hereby required and directed to suppress the same and to abate any
nuisance as is described in the first section of this ordinance.
id.
23. Id. at 451. "The ordinance prohibits the distribution of literature of any kind
" Id.
at any time, at any place, and in any manner ..
24. The Court feared that legislation of this kind would restore the system of
licensing and censorship with which English authors had to contend until 1694. Id.
at 451-52. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTI-

713-14 (1978).
25. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).

TUTIONAL LAW

26. Id. at 162-63.
27. Id. at 162.
28. Id. The Court suggested that the cities could prevent littering by punishing
those who actually dropped the papers. Id.
29. Id. at 163. The applicant had to provide the police officer with evidence as to
his good character and the absence of fraud in his intended activity, "a burdensome
and inquisitorial examination" which made the applicant's door-to-door solicitation
dependent on the officer's discretion. Id. at 163-64.
30. Id. at 164.
31. Id. The Court suggested that frauds and trespasses could be legally punished.
Id.
32. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). The statute provided in part:
No person shall solicit money, services, subscriptions or any valuable thing
for any alleged religious, charitable or philanthropic cause, . . . unless
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Cantwell, a state law conditioned religious solicitation upon the issuance of a license, authorized by a city official, based on a personal
determination of whether the cause was religious. 3 The Court found
that the ordinance served to censor religion, contravening the four34
teenth amendment's due process guarantee.
The Court continued its condemnation of unbridled administrative
discretion in Largent v. Texas. 35 Largent involved an ordinance which
made it unlawful to solicit orders or sell books, wares or merchandise
in the residential area of the city without filing an application and
obtaining a permit.36 The Court found that the mayor could issue a
permit if he considered it "proper or advisable" to do so.37 His role as
administrative censor allowed the mayor to condition the flow of ideas
upon his own approval of the speaker. The Court found that this level
of discretion abridged the appellant's freedoms of speech and religion,
3
and freedom of the press .
The Court also has invalidated licensing taxes which may encroach
upon an individual's first amendment rights. In Murdock v. Pennsylvania,39 an ordinance required that a fee be paid before a license to
solicit could be procured. 40 "Those who can tax the exercise of this
such cause shall have been approved by the secretary of the public welfare
council. Upon application of any person in behalf of such cause, the
secretary shall determine whether such cause is a religious one . .. and, if
he shall so find, shall approve the same and issue to the authority in charge
a certificate to that effect. Such certificate may be revoked at any time.
Id. at 301-02.
33. Id. at 306. See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (control over right to
speak on religious subjects cannot be vested in administrative official who has no
appropriate standards for guidance); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271-72
(1951) ("amorphous 'practice,' " with all authority to grant permits resting with the
City Commissioner and the City Council, was unconstitutional).
34. 310 U.S. at 303. In the Court's opinion, the statute's licensing system was one
of prior restraint, which could not be remedied by the availability of judicial review
to examine the system's abuses. Id. at 306. However, the Court indicated that states
could require strangers in the community to establish their identity and authority
before being permitted to solicit. Id.
35. 318 U.S. 418 (1943).
36. Id. The appellant, a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses, was convicted for
violating the ordinance, because she attempted to sell books without a tag. Id. at 419.
See Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (ordinance could not prohibit written
dissemination of information, and Court unwilling to prohibit distribution of religious literature merely because handbills invited reader to purchase books and raise
funds).
37. 318 U.S. at 422.
38. Id.
39. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
40. Id. at 106. The ordinance, which was over 40 years old, required all solicitors
to procure a license, for which they had to pay the Treasurer $1.50 per day, $7.00
per week, $12 for two weeks, and $20 for three weeks. Id. The Court indicated that a

1983]

RELIGIOUS SOLICITATION

religious practice," the Court stated, "can make its exercise so costly as
to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance."-4 1 The
Court added, however, that the payment of a nominal fee to assist in
defraying the cost of policing solicitation activities would be permissi42
ble.
The denial of the use of a public forum was at issue in Niemotko v.
Maryland.43 The case involved a custom which required those who
wished to use a public park to obtain permits from the park commissioner. 44 However, the commissioner refused to grant a group of
Jehovah's Witnesses permission to conduct Sunday Bible talks in the
park. 45 When the appellants defied the custom and held their meet46
ing, two of them were arrested and convicted of disorderly conduct.
The Court overturned the convictions, finding the permit procedure
unconstitutional. 47 The park commissioner and the city council could
not have exclusive authority to grant permits for the use of the park,
the Court stressed, without any justifiable standards, limitations, or
48
community interests to be served.

C. Percentage Requirements
The Court examined the use of percentage requirements in Village
of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment.4 The ordinance
registration ordinance to identify solicitors who were strangers in the community
would be permissible. Id. at 116.
41. Id. at 112.
42. Id. at 113-14.

43. 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
44. Id. at 269. No ordinance was involved in the case. It was the custom for
individuals and groups to obtain permits to use the park. Id.
45. Id. at 269-70. According to the custom, the commissioner's actions were
appealable to the city council, but the written request which the Jehovah's Witnesses
filed with the council was also denied. Id. at 270.
46. Id. The Court noted that the jury's finding must have been based on appellant's use of the park without a permit, even though no statute or ordinance required
such a permit. Id. at 271.
47. Id. at 273. The Court examined similar criteria in Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). For demonstrating in front of a high school, the
appellant was convicted of violating the city's antipicketing and antinoise ordinances. Id. at 105-06. The antinoise ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague and
was limited in time and place. Id. at 110-11. In addition, it did not permit the
exercise of governmental discretion, nor did it permit the proponent of an unpopular
view to be punished. Id. at 113. Thus, the antinoise ordinance was found constitutional.- Id. at 106. However, the antipicketing ordinance was declared unconstitutional, because it violated the equal protection clause. Id. at 107. The Court added
that "[t]he right to use a public place for expressive activity may be restricted only for
weighty reasons." Id. at 115.
48. Niemotko, 340 U.S. at 272.
49. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
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at issue prohibited charitable organizations that did not use at least
seventy-five percent of their funds for "charitable purposes" from
soliciting. 50 According to the Court, the ordinance was an interference
with protected speech, not justified by the municipality's interests
" 'in protecting the public from fraud, crime, and undue annoyance.' "51 These interests, the Court stated, "are only peripherally
promoted by the 75-percent requirement and could be sufficiently
served by measures less destructive of First Amendment interests." 52
The use of percentage requirements in religious solicitation cases
was examined by the Court in Larson v. Valente.5 3 The Court invalidated the statute, rejecting the governmental interests asserted to
justify a regulation.5 4 Under the statute, religious organizations soliciting more than fifty percent of their funds from non-members had to
fulfill registration and reporting requirements which were not imposed on other religious organizations. 5 5 The statute was being applied, according to the Court, to grant certain religious denominations preference over others, in derogation of the establishment clause
56
of the first amendment.
D. The Booth Solicitation Rule
The Court applied the reasonable time, place and manner test, first
used in Lovell, 5 to evaluate the validity of a booth solicitation rule in
50. Id. at 622. The definition of "charitable purposes" excluded solicitation
expenses, salaries, overhead, and other administrative expenses. Id.
51. Id. at 636.
52. Id. The Court's suggestions of less restrictive measures included the utilization of penal laws, and efforts to prompt charitable organizations to disclose their
finances. Id. at 637-38. The advantage of the latter measure is that it "may help
make contribution decisions more informed, while leaving to individual choice the
decision whether to contribute to organizations that spend large amounts on salaries
and administrative expenses." Id. at 638.
53. 102 S. Ct. 1673 (1982).
54. Id. at 1689. According to the Court, the state did not provide any support for
the three premises of its statute: (1) that when a religious organization's membership
contributes over 50% of the organization's funds, the membership itself can control
solicitation; (2) that membership control is a safeguard by which to protect the public
from abusive solicitation; (3) that the percentage of non-member contributions and
the necessity for public disclosure are in direct correlation. Id. at 1685-86.
55. Id. at 1676-77.
56. Id. at 1689. "The fifty per cent rule ... effects the selective legislative
imposition of burdens and advantages upon particular denominations. The 'risk of
politicizing religion' . . . is obvious ..
" Id. at 1688. The Court qualified this
statement, however, by noting that if the statute had been imposed "evenhandedly,"
it might have been constitutional. Id.
57. 303 U.S. 444 (1938). For a discussion of Lovell, see notes 21-24 supra and
accompanying text.
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Heffron v. ISKCON, Inc.5 8 The rule provided that both the sale and
distribution of merchandise, including written literature and fund
solicitation, had to be conducted from within a rented booth. 5 The
Court upheld the validity of the rule, finding the state's interest in
crowd control at a state fair to be a reasonable justification. 0 The
Court explained that less restrictive means, such as imposing a penal
sanction for disorder or limiting the number of solicitors, would not be
adequate."'
Moreover, the Court applied an "alternative forum" theory.62 Under this approach, the availability of alternative forums for the expression of protected speech may help to justify the restrictions imposed by
the rule.6 3 Finding the fair to be a "limited public forum," the Court
emphasized that the rule did not prevent ISKCON from proselytizing
ISKCON members the
outside the fairgrounds, nor did the rule deny
64
opportunity to mingle with the fair patrons.
Heffron may represent a movement toward a more expansive view
of the scope of permissible regulation of religious solicitation. 5 Al58. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
59. Id. at 643-44. Minnesota State Fair Rule 6.05 provides, in part: "[slale or
distribution of any merchandise including printed or written material except under
license issued [by] the [Minnesota Agricultural] Society and/or from a duly-licensed
location shall be a misdemeanor." The Society interprets the rule to mean that all
sales, exhibitions, and distribution of materials is limited to fixed locations at the fair.
Id. at 643.
60. Id. at 653-54. The Court found that the state's substantial interest in avoiding
congestion and maintaining crowd control could be achieved by confining solicitation to booths. Id.
61. Id. at 654. According to the Court, affirming the lower court's decision
would result in an even larger number of solicitors at the fair. Id.
62. id.
63. See note 66 infra and accompanying text.
64. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 655. In view of the fair's limited function and area, the
Court concluded that the rule was equitable. Id.
65. Hejfron has been widely criticized for limiting religious solicitation. See
Casenote, Heffron v. ISKCON, Inc.: A Restrictive ConstitutionalView of the Proselytizing Rights of Religious Organizations,9 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 519 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Casenote, Restrictive View]; Note, Time, Place, and Manner Regulations
of Expressive Activities in the Public Forum, 61 NEB. L. REV. 167 (1982).
Since the Supreme Court noted the somewhat unique characteristics of the state
fair, other writers have apparently felt equally free to do so, pointing out, for
example, that the relaxation of the booth rule could not increase the confusion and
disorder inherent in the nature of a state fair. Casenote, Restrictive View, supra, at
537. Perhaps more importantly, it has been noted that Heffron "represents the
Court's first approval of a ban on handbilling and solicitation of contributions in a
public forum suitable for such activity." Note, supra, at 181.
Both of these articles view the Court's distinction between the actions taken by
fairgoers who merely stop to listen and those who stop to donate or to receive
literature as arbitrary and lacking a clear purpose. Casenote, Restrictive View,
supra, at 537-38; Note, supra, at 183.

854
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though the Heffron Court used the reasonable time, place, and manner test first announced in Lovell, the addition of the "alternative
forum analysis" 66 may indicate a judicial reluctance to further expand
first amendment rights of religious solicitors.

III. Establishing Criteria: Lower Courts' Interpretations
During the 1970's and 1980's, lower courts have relied upon the
guidelines established by Supreme Court cases to evaluate the regulation of religious solicitation. Although the lower courts have articulated certain clearly defined principles, there is still a need for a more
definitive approach by which to evaluate constitutionally suspect legislation.
A. Absolute Prohibitions and Overbreadth
Ordinances which absolutely prohibit religious solicitation have7
been held to be blatant infringements of first amendment rights.

A third article propounded the view that the Court should have separately analyzed the three different activities which the rule restricted: sales, solicitation, and
distribution of literature. Casenote, Heffron v. ISKCON, Inc.: Reasonable Time,
Place and Manner Restrictions, 15 J. MAR. L. REv. 543, 553 (1982). The author felt
that crowd flow and movement were restricted by sales and solicitation, but like the
other two writers, he could not distinguish the distribution of literature from proselytism itself, which the Court allowed to go unregulated. Id. at 552.
Writers have agreed that the Court did not give enough consideration to the
possibility of less restrictive regulation. Casenote, Restrictive View, supra, at 539;
Note, supra, at 182. One reasonable alternative would have been to limit the number
of people who could come to the fair to distribute or sell literature or to solicit
donations. Casenote, Restrictive View, supra, at 539. It has also been suggested that
the Court's decision may have been influenced by the controversial nature of
ISKCON itself. Id. at 546; Note, supra, at 185.
66. It has been asserted that Heffron introduced the "ample alternative forum
inquiry," which could make the availability of ample alternative forums a decisive
criterion of courts' opinions in the future. Note, supra note 65, at 184-85. See also L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

603 (1978) (governmental regulation which

excludes first amendment activity from a public forum cannot be justified by the
availability of alternative forums); United States v. Silberman, 464 F. Supp. 866, 874
there are alternative
(M.D. Fla. 1979) )("[I]t is no redeeming justification that ...
public forums available in different places."). But see ISKCON, Inc. v. City of New
York, 501 F. Supp. 684, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("There are easily accessible alternative
channels for communication of ISKCON's ideas.").
67. See McMurdie v. Doutt, 468 F. Supp. 766 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (unlawful for
mayor to completely cut off Unification Church's first amendment right to secure
permits); ISKCON, Inc. v. Conlisk, 374 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (arbitrary
infringement on exercise of first amendment rights to limit solicitation to one day per
year). See also note 206 infra and accompanying text.
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Closely related to absolute prohibitions are ordinances which are
overly broad in their scope. 8 A court will find an ordinance overly
broad if it does not regulate religious solicitation in the least restrictive
manner. 9 Moreover, if an ordinance punishes the exercise of first
amendment rights regardless of whether the exercise results in actual
or potential disruption, courts will hold the ordinance void for overbreadth. 0
For example, in Westfall v. Board of Commissioners,7' an ordinance limited the hours of solicitation, the number of solicitors in an
organization, and required solicitors to carry a detailed identification
card. 72 The court called this limitation a "blanket prohibition" and a
"complete abridgement" of the plaintiff's right to engage in religious
solicitation in any public forum, under any circumstances. 73 The court
found that the ordinance was overly broad, and recommended that
the county narrow the areas to which the time restriction would
74
apply.
Courts seem to fear that, if overly broad regulations are not controlled, they will be enforced at the discretion of the administrator in
68. See Westfall v. Board of Comm'rs, 477 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. Ga. 1979)
(blanket prohibitions on use of public streets, areas, and parks for solicitation between 6:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m. was overbroad); ISKCON of W. Pa., Inc. v. Griffin,
437 F. Supp. 666, 670, 672-73 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (ordinance prohibited solicitation on
48 days of the year and during rush hours on Sunday, Monday, and Friday, limited
plaintiffs' solicitations to designated solicitation booths, and restricted the number of
solicitors at the airport to two per day); Smith v. City of Manchester, 460 F. Supp. 30
(E.D. Tenn. 1978) (Manchester Municipal Code provisions constituted overly broad
licensing device).
69. See Westfall v. Board of Comm'rs, 477 F. Supp. 862, 871 (N.D. Ga. 1979)
(defendants failed to show that interest in protecting citizens from crime and undue
annoyance could not be accomplished by less restrictive means); ISKCON of Western
Pa., Inc. v. Griffin, 437 F. Supp. 666, 672 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (airport sought to
prohibit religious solicitation at the precise times when it was likely to be most
effective). But see ISKCON, Inc. v. Evans, 440 F. Supp. 414, 425 (S.D. Ohio 1977)
(fair required some form of regulation, and regulations at issue were best available
means of accommodating conflicting interests).
70. See Westfall v. Board of Comm'rs, 477 F. Supp. 862, 871 (N.D. Ga. 1979)
(ordinance which punished exercises of expression occurring between 6:00 p.m. and
9:00 a.m. without regard to their possible or actual consequences was overly broad).
71. 477 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
72. Id. at 864. Solicitation within the county was restricted to the hours of 9:00
a.m. to 6:00 p.m. The regulation limited the number of solicitors for any single
organization to 25 and required an elaborate identification procedure. Solicitors had
to present their identification cards, information as to the nature and purpose of the
solicitation, the name and home or national office or headquarters of the organization, and any minimum donation required for the acceptance of any merchandise.
Id.at 864-65.
73. Id. at 871.
74. Id. at 871-72.
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charge.75 For example, an overly broad statute is likely to be adminis-

tered discretionally where religious solicitation is conditioned expressly on obtaining a permit from an administrative official, and no
76
further guidelines are established.

B. Vagueness
A vague ordinance or statute creates great risk of abuse and constitutional violation. Caused by lack of clarity or deficiency in an ordinance's explanation of its coverage, 77 vagueness is sometimes viewed
as a double threat by the courts. Vagueness may prevent applicants
from being fairly notified of the ordinance's requirements,7 and may
permit administrative officials to exercise personal discretion in apply7
ing the ordinance.
An example of how too much administrative discretion may result
from a vague ordinance may be found in ISKCON, Inc. v. Roch-

75. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Manchester, 460 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
The regulation prohibited religious solicitation without a permit from the city recorder, who could institute a "reasonable investigation" to determine whether a
permit should be granted. Id. at 35. The court would not tolerate "[s]uch a sweeping
and improper administrative application .. ."Id.
76. See notes 87-93 infra and accompanying text.
77. See ISKCON of Atlanta v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809, 832 (5th Cir. 1979) (section
of ordinance precluding hampering or impeding authorized business held unconstitutionally vague, because unclear what actions the section was intended to proscribe);
ISKCON, Inc. v. Rochford, 585 F.2d 263, 268 (7th Cir. 1978) (regulations deficient
in not explaining who was " 'authorized by law' " to distribute literature and solicit
contributions). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 66, at 718. Professor Tribe considers two
findings necessary to a determination of vagueness: "that the individual challenging
the statute is indeed one of the entrapped innocent, and that it would have been
practical for the legislature to draft more precisely." Id. at 719.
78. See ISKCON of Atlanta v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809, 832 (5th Cir. 1979) (people
in appellants' position cannot know what construction to expect); Walker v. Wegner,
477 F. Supp. 648, 651 (D.S.D. 1979) (vague statute may fail to give applicant fair
notice). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 66, at 718 (In vague regulation, "the line
between innocent and condemned conduct becomes a matter of guesswork.").
79. See ISKCON, Inc. v. Rochford, 585 F.2d 263, 270 (7th Cir. 1978) (provisions
not sufficiently precise to avoid improper administrative application); Walker v.
Wegner, 477 F. Supp. 648, 653 (D.S.D. 1979) (administrator had discretion to
decide meaning of vague terms).
Moreover, in deciding whether to declare an ordinance void for vagueness, it is
unclear whether courts should consider the purpose of the regulation which the
municipality sets forth. Compare ISKCON of Atlanta v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809, 830
(5th Cir. 1979) (benefits of provisions which make substantial contribution to important goal outweigh burdens placed on religious solicitation, so provisions are constitutional) with ISKCON, Inc. v. Rochford, 425 F. Supp. 734, 740 (N.D. I11.
1977)
(stating regulation's salutary purpose will not cure its vagueness), aff'd in part, revd
in part, 585 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1978).
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ford.80 The court noted that the airport's primary purpose was to
handle heavy traffic flow. 8 However, while the regulation permitted
only those "authorized by law" to distribute literature and solicit
contributions,8 2 the regulation's explanation of legal authority was
deficient. 83 Thus, the court voided several parts of the regulation for
vagueness. 8 4 The regulation's deficiency, according to the court, was
more critical than vagueness alone, because when viewed in conjunction with the regulation's other requirements, airport officials could
grant or deny permit applications based on a personal interpretation
of who was "authorized by law." 8' The court concluded that the
uncertainty of these vague subsections could permit airport officials to
decide which of the possible meanings should be applied.8 8 Thus, a
vague regulation, like an overly broad regulation, may suffer from an
additional infirmity-too much administrative discretion.

80. 425 F. Supp. 734 (N.D. Ill. 1977), af'd in part, rev'd in part, 585 F.2d 263
(7th Cir. 1978).
81. 585 F.2d at 271. The district court had refused to be influenced by the goals
which the city of Chicago hoped to achieve through regulation of its airports.
According to the city, the regulation was meant to (1) assure fair use of the airport
facilities; (2) prevent interference with free access to and passage among airport
facilities; (3) discourage interference with people waiting in lines; (4) prevent interference with airport security; (5) provide equal access for the publication of views.
425 F. Supp. at 737.
82. 425 F. Supp. at 737.
83. 585 F.2d at 268.
84. Id. at 270. The district court cited the following as examples of vagueness: (1)
unclear whether prohibition against selling "anything for commercial purposes"
included sale of religious tracts and materials; (2) unclear whether prohibition
against " 'noise ... [or] other disturbance . .. ' " included speech; (3) unclear
whether prohibition against "more than one person at a time" soliciting any individual was meant to apply to the time during which the individual was within the
airport or the time during which he was being solicited; (4) unclear whether prohibition against erecting any structure applied solely to lessees; (5) unclear how weather,
extremely heavy traffic, "or other causes" could warrant suppressing all first amendment rights at the airports. 425 F. Supp. at 741-42. In reviewing the lower court's
decision, the court of appeals agreed that the first two subsections described were
vague, but found that the prohibition against erecting any structure did not restrict
first amendment rights, and that the final subsection criticized by the district court
was meant to deal solely with unusual congestion or emergency security situations
and was sufficiently narrow and definite. 585 F.2d at 270. The prohibition against
solicitation by more than one person at a time was not vague, but was unconstitutional as an invalid restraint upon first amendment rights. Id.
85. 585 F.2d at 268.
86. Id. at 270. According to the district court, these subsections "are utterly
lacking in standards that can guide airport officials in making decisions which may
manifest the censor's heavy hand on the freedom of religion, of thought, speech and
the press." 425 F. Supp. at 742.
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C. Administrative Discretion
Regardless of whether ordinances are deemed overly broad or
vague, if they vest excessive discretion in administrative officials, the
ordinances may be invalidated. Courts fear that once administrative
discretion is permitted and exercised, it inevitably will result in discriminatory application.8 7 To guard against religious discrimination,
courts have invalidated a number of ordinances which grant excessive
administrative discretion.88 In fact, courts have not required that
discretion actually be exercised before the ordinance will be held to be
unconstitutional.
Similarly, uniformity in application will not necessarily insure that
an ordinance will be upheld. For example, an ordinance which
granted an airport director the discretion to allow or prevent distribution of literature and solicitation of contributions on airport grounds
has been declared unconstitutional despite its uniform application.8 9
In ISKCON, Inc. v. Engelhardt,0 no personal solicitation had been
permitted since the construction of the airport. 9 1 The ordinance, how-

87. In Smith v. City of Manchester, 460 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Tenn. 1978), the city
recorder was vested with discretion in administering the Manchester Municipal
Code's licensing device, since the recorder was to conduct " 'a reasonable investigation ... ' " to determine whether the permit should be issued. Id. at 35. She testified
that her reasons for denying plaintiffs' permit were that they did not represent a local
or established church, and that the chief of police had advised her of past problems
with the plaintiffs and of his personal belief that it would be in the community's best
interest to deny the permit. Id. The court concluded that this administrative interpretation would prevent non-local organizations and groups from ever being permitted to engage in religious solicitation in Manchester. Id.
88. See Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 629 (5th Cir. 1981) (Board's unguided opinion as to legitimacy of applicant's organization should not be basis upon
which permits are granted or denied), cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 5 (1982); Conlon v.
City of N. Kansas City, Mo., 530 F. Supp. 985, 988 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (ordinance
may not effectively vest discretion to grant or deny solicitation certificates in city
officials); Sylte v. Metropolitan Gov't, 493 F. Supp. 313, 319 (M.D. Tenn. 1980) (per
curiam) (court objected to "a subjective thicket without objective criteria"); Weissman v. City of Alamogordo, 472 F. Supp. 425, 430 (D.N.M. 1979) (state authority
should not be empowered to determine what is a "religious cause"); McMurdie v.
Doutt, 468 F. Supp. 766, 772 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (ordinance authorized mayor's
exercise of "unbridled discretion"); ISKCON, Inc. v. Lentini, 461 F. Supp. 49, 51
(E.D. La. 1978) (no standards to guide discretion which regulation vested in Director
of Aviation); Swearson v. Meyers, 455 F. Supp. 88, 92 (D. Kan. 1978) (ordinance
called upon city officials to exercise discretion); ISKCON of Berkeley, Inc. v.
Kearnes, 454 F. Supp. 116, 120 (E.D. Cal. 1978) (strict limitations upon criteria for
obtaining permit required to protect against administrative officials' arbitrary denial).
89. ISKCON v. Engelhardt, 425 F. Supp. 176, 180 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
90. 425 F. Supp. 176 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
91. Id. at 179.
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ever, was invalidated because it offered no standards for granting
permits 2 or for limiting the licensing authority's discretion.93 Thus,
courts will look to whether a statute has the inherent potential to
provide too much discretion, rather than to the practical effects of the
statute.
D. Equal Protection
Discriminatory or inconsistent enforcement of ordinances which
regulate religious solicitation may constitute an infringement of the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. 4 In Troyer v. Town of Babylon,9 5 an ordinance prohibited
door-to-door distribution of religious literature and solicitation of
funds without an occupant's prior consent.96 However, solicitors residing or maintaining a place of business in the town for at least six
months were exempted from the ordinance.9 7 According to the court,
the ordinance's application prevented those with unrepresented views
from using a forum available to residents. 8 This distinction between
residents and nonresidents subjected the regulation to strict scrutiny
under the equal protection clause. 9 The court, finding that the town's
interests in the ordinance were not sufficient to justify the burdens
which it imposed, declared the ordinance unconstitutional. 10 0

92. Id. at 180.
93. Id. See also United States v. Silberman, 464 F. Supp. 866, 873-74 (M.D. Fla.
1979) (regulation of first amendment rights must contain narrow, definitive, and
objective criteria, and "it is no redeeming justification that a complete prohibition is
uniform and across the board, without discrimination ..
"). But see ISKCON, Inc.
v. City of New York, 501 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The court noted that the
New York City Police Department's policy of maintaining a "buffer zone" near the
United Nations could lead to police officers' making discretionary decisions, but it
upheld the policy's constitutionality, apparently impressed by the uniform manner in
which the policy had been applied. Id. at 694-95. It is interesting to note that the
court based its conclusion not on positive evidence, but rather on a lack of negative
evidence-the fact that nothing in the record showed that the policy had ever been
exercised with bias. Id. at 692. For a similar rationale, see City of Manchester v.
Leiby, 117 F.2d 661 (1st Cir. 1941).
94. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
95. 483 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 628 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), aff'd sub nom.
Town of Southampton v. Troyer, 449 U.S. 988 (1980).
96. 483 F. Supp. at 1136.
97. Id. at 1136-37.
98. Id. at 1139.
99. Id. at 1140. For a similar distinction between residents and nonresidents, see
Smith v. City of Manchester, 460 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
100. 483 F. Supp. at 1142. The town's interests were in reducing litter and
maintaining privacy and property values. Id.
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E. Percentage Requirements
An ordinance also may be discriminatory if it imposes percentage
requirements. For example, some ordinances regulate more strictly
the solicitation of those groups whose expenses surpass a certain percentage of the total funds collected. 101 Ordinances which impose percentage requirements have been invalidated for being insufficiently
tailored to serve asserted interests 10 2 and for vesting discretion in
administrative officials. 103 Primarily, however, courts invalidate ordinances which impose percentage requirements because of their dis10 4
criminatory application.
The ordinance in CarolinaAction v. Pickard'0 5 required denial of
permit applications indicating that fund raising activities would cost
more than twenty-five percent of what the organization would
raise.106 By making solicitation dependent on a showing that the
plaintiffs' ideas would be sufficiently popular to obtain a specified
percentage of the amount solicited, the court stated that the ordinance
posed the greatest threat to controversial organizations. 01 7 According
101. See Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 629-30 (5th Cir. 1981) (airport
asserted interest in preventing fraud; permit could be refused if expected cost of
solicitation would be excessive in relationship to total amount collected, and cost of
solicitation in excess of 25 % of total collected gave rise to rebuttable presumption of
excessiveness), cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 5 (1982); Sylte v. Metropolitan Gov't, 493
F. Supp. 313, 317, 319 (M.D. Tenn. 1980) (per curiam) (county's interest was in
public welfare; tax exempt organizations could be exempted from the ordinance by
providing sworn statement that no more than 25% of the organization's financial
support was solicited from outside sources); Carolina Action v. Pickard, 465 F. Supp.
576, 579-80 (W.D.N.C. 1979) (city enacted ordinance to protect against fraud and
misrepresentation; groups whose solicitation expenses might constitute more than
25 % of their revenues were absolutely prohibited from soliciting).
102. See Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 629 (5th Cir. 1981) (airport's
interests were in protecting against fraudulent or annoying solicitation), cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 5 (1982); Carolina Action v. Pickard, 465 F. Supp. 576, 581
(W.D.N.C. 1979) (unrelieved limitation on cost of solicitation makes right to canvass
dependent upon content of message rather than upon community's legitimate interest
in canvassers' character).
103. See Sylte v. Metropolitan Gov't, 493 F. Supp. 313, 319 (M.D. Tenn. 1980)
(per curiam) (unclear what information ordinance really required); Carolina Action
v. Pickard, 465 F. Supp. 576, 579 (W.D.N.C. 1979) (ordinance's ambiguous wording
resulted in inconsistent administration).
104. Carolina Action v. Pickard, 465 F. Supp. 576, 581 (W.D.N.C. 1979) (court
noted that ordinance was to the disadvantage of unpopular groups).
105. Id. at 582-85.
106. Id. at 578-79.
107. Id. at 581. Controversial organizations were most likely to be adversely
affected by several other aspects of the ordinance as well: it was both overbroad and
vague, vested the city commission with complete discretion in determining whether
to believe an organization's financial projections, and required the commission to
find that the solicited funds would be placed in "responsible and reliable" hands. Id.
at 580-82.

1983]

RELIGIOUS SOLICITATION

to the court, these organizations are most in need of protection for
their first amendment rights. 108
F. Fees
Like ordinances which contain percentage requirements, ordinances which condition solicitation on payment of a fee may have the
greatest impact on those organizations with the least funds to support
their solicitation activity. Solicitation fees have been condemned because they imply that an individual may be charged for the use of first
amendment rights. 0 Thus, fees are permissible only if they are nominal ' 0 and are used to defray costs which can be shown to be related to
the solicitation activity."' Furthermore, the government must show a
2
relationship between the fee and the costs of licensing.1
The local ordinance in Fernandesv. Limmer 1 3 charged a $6.00 per
day fee, which was to be collected in advance to defray the costs of
investigating solicitors, preparing permits, and supervising solicitation
5
activities. " 4 This licensing fee was held to be impermissible. 11
The fee
was moderate, but was not shown to be necessary and related to the
costs of the licensing process."" Under these circumstances, the court
was unwilling to condition the exercise of first amendment rights "on
a colporteur's willingness and ability to pay .
11117
".. However, a fee
charged for the rental of solicitation booths at a state fair was found

108. Id. at 581.
109. See Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1981) (exaction of fees for
privilege of using first amendment rights condemned), cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 5
(1982). See also Troyer v. Town of Babylon, 483 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D.N.Y.) (requiring householders' prior consent constitutes unconstitutional imposition of licensing
fee by generating costs which burden the exercise of first amendment rights), afJ'd,
628 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), aff'd sub nom., Town of Southhampton v. Troyer, 449 U.S.
988 (1980).
110. See ISKCON of W. Pa., Inc. v. Griffin, 437 F. Supp. 666, 670-71 (W.D. Pa.
1977) ($10 per day permit fee excessive).
111. See ISKCON, Inc. v. Evans, 440 F. Supp. 415, 422 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (fee
charged for rental of booth space not constitutionally improper, because purpose to
defray expenses from exhibitors' activities).
112. See Fernandes v. Limmer, .663 F.2d 619, 633 (5th Cir. 1981) (ordinance
should not impose even moderate exaction on privilege of using public forum for
protected purpose, unless governmental body demonstrates link between fee and
costs of licensing), cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 5 (1982).
113. 663 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 5 (1982).
114. Id. at 639.
115. Id. at 633.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XI

constitutional, because it was meant to defray the expenses of the
exhibitors' activities.' 18
G. Insufficient Government Interests
Despite the particular ground on which a plaintiff may challenge
an ordinance, the government has the burden of showing that the
state interest asserted necessitates the regulation of religious solicitation.1 9 In measuring this burden, the courts have been unable to
reach a consensus on the nature of the interest which a governmental
entity must assert to justify its solicitation regulation. Most courts,
however, find that an interest in the prevention of fraud is an insuffi20
cient justification.

118. ISKCON, Inc. v. Evans, 440 F. Supp. 414, 424 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
119. For the necessity of demonstrating a compelling state interest, see Larson v.
Valente, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 1685 (1982) (state statute imposing registration and reporting requirements on certain religious organizations invalidated); ISKCON, Inc. v.
Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 445 (2d Cir. 1981) (state failed to demonstrate that booth
solicitation rule was least intrusive means of regulation); Edwards v. Maryland State
Fair & Agricultural Soc'y, Inc., 628 F.2d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 1980) (enforcement of
booth solicitation rule at state fair denied ISKCON's first amendment rights); United
States v. Silberman, 464 F. Supp. 866, 872 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (regulation which
prohibited business solicitation in park areas without permit not violated by defendant's religious solicitation); ISKCON, Inc. v. Hays, 438 F. Supp. 1077, 1081 (S.D.
Fla. 1977) (regulation prohibiting solicitation without written permission invalidated). For an example of the necessity of demonstrating a paramount interest, see
Westfall v. Board of Comm'rs, 477 F. Supp. 862, 867 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (ordinance's
identification requirements overly burdensome). For an example of the necessity of
demonstrating a substantial interest, see Heffron v. ISKCON, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 654
(1981) (state fair's booth solicitation rule valid time, place, and manner restriction on
religious solicitation); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271-72 (1951) (park's
availability for first amendment activity cannot be determined by "amorphous"
custom). For an example of the necessity of demonstrating a significant interest, see
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (first amendment protection extends to commercial speech). For
an example of the necessity of demonstrating a legitimate interest, see Liberman v.
Schesventer, 447 F. Supp. 1355, 1361 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (regulation governing sale
and distribution of literature in national parks constitutional means of accommodating conflicting interests). See also ISKCON, Inc. v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition
Auth., 532 F. Supp. 1088, 1102 (D.N.J. 1981) (significance of governmental interest
to be assessed in light of facility's characteristics, nature and functions; Authority
permitted to forbid solicitation), aJf'd mem., 691 F.2d 155 (1982).
120. See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 637
(1980) ("Fraudulent misrepresentations can be prohibited and the penal laws used to
punish such conduct directly."); Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 629 (5th Cir.
1981) ("There are other means, such as penal laws, to prevent and punish frauds
without intruding on First Amendment freedoms.
...
), cert. dismissed, 103 S.Ct.
5 (1982); Edwards v. Maryland State Fair & Agricultural Soc'y, Inc., 628 F.2d 282,
286 (4th Cir. 1980) ("[T]he penal laws available to prevent fraud are clearly less
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One case which provides some additional guidelines is Troyer v.
Town of Babylon. 2' Through its ordinance, the defendant town
sought to reduce litter from distributed printed material and protect
its residents' privacy against solicitor victimization. Since many of the
towns' homes are occupied only during the summer months, and
printed material left by solicitors could therefore turn unoccupied
homes into targets for burglars, the town felt that it was especially
justified in regulating solicitation. 122 However, the court did not
agree.12 3 Interests in protecting residents' privacy, reducing litter and
maintaining property values were deemed insufficient justification for
the burdens the ordinance imposed on the plaintiff's constitutional
24
rights. 1
H. Identification Procedures
Solicitors' rights may be infringed upon by excessive identification
procedures. The state's right to require solicitors to establish their
identity is longstanding. 2 5 However, the nature of permissible enforcement is unclear. For example, a requirement that solicitors wear
restrictive of expression than the 'booth rule.' "); ISKCON, Inc. v. Bowen, 600 F.2d
667, 669 (7th Cir.) ("The interest in combating fraud is served by the use of penal
laws to punish this conduct."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979); ISKCON v. State
Fair of Tex., 480 F. Supp. 67, 68 n.2 (N.D. Tex. 1979) ("Fraud can be adequately
prevented by enforcement of Texas criminal law by the use of plainclothes policemen
or by other means."); Weissman v. City of Alamogordo, 472 F. Supp. 425, 431
(D.N.M. 1979) ("[F]rauds may be denounced as offenses punished by law; and
trespasses may similarly be forbidden, but not in a manner treading on First Amendment rights.").
For the contention that keeping the streets clean and attractive is insufficient
justification for regulation, see Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); ISKCON,
Inc. v. Bowen, 600 F.2d 667, 670 (7th Cir.) ("The generation of litter as a result of
the otherwise lawful distribution of literature does not justify the restrictions sought
by the defendants ..
"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979).
121. 483 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 628 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), aJf'd sub nom.
Town of Southhampton v. Troyer, 449 U.S. 988 (1980).
122. 483 F. Supp. at 1136.
123. Id. at 1139. If the town was going to supplement state law, the court said,
the town would have to do so without burdening the exercise of first amendment
rights. Id. New York statutes "permit the householder or the consumer to take
affirmative action by posting to prevent solicitation and by punishing illegal conduct ..
" Id. at 1138. The court stated that the town's concern for its residents'
privacy could be abated by advising residents that they could warn away unwanted
solicitors by posting signs. Id. at 1142.
124. Id. When measured against these burdens, evidence that property values
might be reduced by posted signs was unpersuasive. Id.
125. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940) (state may require
stranger to establish identification and authority to solicit). See also Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 116 (1943) (dictum indicating that ordinances may
require solicitors to identify themselves).
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identification cards has been upheld by some courts 26 and invalidated
by others. 127
28
Westfall v. Board of Commissioners1
provides an example of
overly burdensome identification requirements. The county's ordinance provided that, immediately prior to solicitation, solicitors must
present their identification cards and request that the cards be read.
The solicitor then had to inform those solicited of: (1) the nature and
purpose of the solicitation, (2) the name and headquarters of the
organization and (3) any minimum donation required for the acceptance of any items. 12 The court found that these identification requirements went "too far" and were overly burdensome. 30 The court
stated that the identification procedures could not be considered necessary to achieve the county's goal of protecting citizens from crime
and undue annoyance.'3 The court suggested that the county could
32
devise a less burdensome method of identification.1
I. Prior Restraint
Just as an ordinance may not overly burden the exercise of first
amendment rights, it may not restrain those rights in advance of their
126. See Edwards v. Maryland State Fair & Agricultural Soc'y, Inc., 628 F.2d
282, 285 n.2 (4th Cir. 1980) (plaintiffs' injunction pending appeal was subject to
condition that solicitors would be required to wear identification cards); ISKCON,
Inc. v. Bowen, 600 F.2d 667, 670 (7th Cir.) (injunction required ISKCON devotees
to wear identification cards at state fair), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979). See also
ISKCON, Inc. v. Rochford, 425 F. Supp. 734, 742 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (neither district
nor circuit court objected to requirement that solicitors wear badges), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 585 F.2d 263, 273 (7th Cir. 1978).
127. See ISKCON, Inc. v. Lentini, 461 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. La. 1978). As support
for the contention that solicitors cannot be required to wear identifying badges, the
court cited Wulp v. Corcoran, 454 F.2d 826 (1st Cir. 1972), in which an ordinance
requiring newspaper vendors to wear official badges was invalidated. Id. at 53. The
court also cited Strasser v. Doorley, 432 F.2d 567 (1st Cir. 1970), in which it was
found unconstitutional to require bootblacks and newsboys to wear numbered metal
badges. Id. In ISKCON of Houston, Inc. v. City of Houston, 482 F. Supp. 852 (S.D.
Tex. 1979), the district court also cited these two cases as support for its holding that
ISKCON devotees could not be required to wear badges. Id. at 865. However, the
district court was overruled by the court of appeals. 689 F.2d 541, 556 (5th Cir.
1982).
128. 477 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
129. Id. at 864-65. Further limitations imposed by the ordinance were that solicitation could only occur between 9:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. and that the number of
solicitors per organization could not exceed 25. Id. at 864.
130. Id. at 867. In attempting to insure that its residents received certain information, the county's ordinance could not require "that a double dose of that information
be administered." Id. In view of the fact that regulation of first amendment rights
must be carefully limited, the court particularly objected to the requirement that the
organization's headquarters be disclosed prior to each solicitation. Id. at 867 n.2.
131. Id. at 867.
132. Id.
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exercise. 133 A state may have salutary reasons for attempting to restrict
certain individuals from soliciting. Nevertheless, to determine who
should be restricted, the state first must determine who would be
likely to engage in the prohibited conduct. 134 This primary determination faces the danger inherent in any prediction-that it will be
incorrect.1 35 With first amendment rights at stake, an incorrect prediction effectively results in censorship. Therefore, to support its use of
at
a prior restraint, a governmental entity is required to demonstrate
6
least a high probability that proscribed speech is imminent.13
Sacramento, California was unable to comply with this requirement in ISKCON of Berkeley, Inc. v. Kearnes. 37 The city's ordinances were adopted as a means of combating fraudulent solicitation. 138 The ordinances instructed a municipal charitable solicitations
committee to consider ten criteria, aimed at revealing fraudulent
intent, in deciding whether to grant a solicitation permit. 3 Rather

133. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 552-53 (1975)
(public officials may not be given power to deny use of forum in advance of expression).
134. See ISKCON of Berkeley, Inc. v. Kearnes, 454 F. Supp. 116, 119 (E.D. Cal.
1978) (permits denied those " 'likely' " to perpetrate frauds). See also ISKCON of
Atlanta v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809, 832 (5th Cir. 1979) (permit automatically revoked
for violating ordinance, and all permits issued to organization revoked if three or
more people representing the same organization were convicted within six months).
135. See ISKCON of Berkeley, Inc. v. Kearnes, 454 F. Supp. 116, 122 (E.D. Cal.
1978) (problem of prediction is key to doctrine of prior restraint).
136. Id. at 123.
137. 454 F. Supp. 116 (E.D. Cal. 1978).
138. Id. at 118.
139. Id. at 118-19. The ten criteria were:
(a) That all of the statements made in the application are true; (b) That
the applicant, and every director, officer, manager, promoter, consultant,
and other agent of the applicant, has a good reputation for integrity and
responsibility; (c) That the applicant, and the persons who are to control,
supervise and promote the solicitation on behalf of the applicant, have not
knowingly violated the provisions of this chapter in the conduct of any
prior solicitation; (d) That the applicant has not engaged in any fraudulent transactions or enterprises which the committee deems relevant to the
application; (e) That the solicitation will not be a fraud on the public; (f)
That the solicitation is prompted solely by the desire to finance the charitable cause described in the application, and will not be conducted for
private profit; (g) That the cost of raising funds will be reasonable; (h)
That, if a promoter or promoters will conduct all or any part of the
solicitation, the provisions of Section 5.64.180 hereof have been complied
with; (i) That the proposed method or methods of soliciting will not be
contrary to the provisions of this chapter; and (j) That the applicant is
maintaining an adequate system of record keeping and accounting, and
has agreed to make such available to the committee or its designees for
inspection.
Id. at 123-24.
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than placing reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on solicitation, these ordinances denied solicitation permits to those who
would " 'likely' " or " 'probably' " engage in fraudulent solicitation.1 40 A reasonable suspicion of fraudulent intent might have been
raised, according to the court, if the ordinances had required the
41
combined presence of all ten criteria, rather than of any one alone.
However, as the ordinances stood, Sacramento could not justify the
prior restraint which the ordinances imposed by showing a high probability that those who were denied permits were about to engage in
42
proscribed speech. 1
J. Procedural Safeguards
In addition to surviving judicial scrutiny under the various methods
of evaluation which have been described thus far, an ordinance which
may possibly infringe upon first amendment rights may have to provide the procedural due process safeguards set forth in Freedman v.
Maryland.'43 Freedman involved a constitutional challenge of a motion picture censorship statute; 44 however, the holding of the case has
been applied widely to challenges of ordinances which regulate religious solicitation. 45 Freedman mandates that: (1) the burden of proving that the regulated activity is an unprotected activity must rest on
the promulgator, (2) there must be no effect of finality lent to the
determination of whether or not the activity constitutes a protected
exercise, (3) the procedure must require a judicial determination; and
(4) the procedure must assure that the final judicial decision will be
prompt. 146
In evaluating the constitutionality of an ordinance which regulates
religious solicitation, courts consider all of these criteria. 47 While the

140. Id. at 119.
141. Id. at 124. Even under those circumstances, the court would not have been
certain that all of the criteria were relevant and constitutional. Id.
142. Id. at 123.
143. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
144. The statute required the prior submission of motion pictures to the State
Board of Censors. Id. at 52. According to the Court, the statute lacked "sufficient
safeguards for confining the censor's action to judicially determined constitutional
limits .. ."Id. at 57.
145. See Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 628 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed,
103 S.Ct. 5 (1982); Conlon v. City of N. Kansas City, Mo., 530 F. Supp. 985, 990
(W.D. Mo. 1981); United States v. Silberman, 464 F. Supp. 866, 873-74 (M.D. Fla.
1979); ISKCON of Berkeley, Inc. v. Kearnes, 454 F. Supp. 116, 120 (E.D. Cal.
1978); ISKCON of W. Pa., Inc. v. Griffin, 437 F. Supp. 666, 670 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
146. 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965).
147. See note 145 supra and accompanying text.
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emphasis is on the -ordinance, courts also take notice of the nature of
the forum in determining whether the ordinance is constitutional.
IV. Limitations on Public Forums
The right to engage in religious solicitation does not mandate access
to all public and private forums. 148 Even when property is publicly
owned, it will not necessarily be available for solicitation or distribution.' 49 However, the vast majority of publicly owned buildings are
held to be public forums, where first amendment rights may be freely
1 50
exercised.
In determining the constitutionality of regulations, courts have
recently begun to consider a forum's "special attributes."' , When
first amendment rights are at issue, it has been suggested that courts
ask whether "the character of the place, the pattern of usual activity,
the nature of its essential purpose and the population who take advantage of the general invitation extended make it an appropriate place
for communication of views on issues of political and social significance."' 5 2 If these criteria are not satisfied, courts may be willing to
limit the accessibility of the forum, resulting in a limited public
53
forum.1
A. Airports
Ordinances which regulate religious solicitation at airports have
been invalidated when the airport is considered to be a public fo-

148. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
149. See ISKCON, Inc. v. Wolke, 453 F. Supp. 869, 873 (E.D. Wis. 1978)
("Prisons, hospitals, office buildings, and other public facilities frequently require
regulations to ensure that free speech activities do not unreasonably interfere with
their functions.").
150. See, e.g., Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 626 (5th Cir. 1981) (references to airport as public forum and public place), cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 5
(1982); ISKCON, Inc. v. Wolke, 453 F. Supp. 869, 873 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (courts
consistently hold public buildings available for first amendment activity).
151. See Heffron v. ISKCON, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 650-51 (1981) ("[C]onsideration
of a forum's special attributes is relevant to the constitutionality of a regulation since
the significance of the governmental interest must be assessed in light of the characteristic nature and function of the particular forum involved."). See also Fernandes
v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 627 (5th Cir. 1981) (Lack of restrictions on entry and
street-like character of airport terminal buildings led court to conclude that they
"must be treated as public forums."), cert. dismissed, 103 S.Ct. 5 (1982).
152. Wolin v. Port of New York Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 89 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 940 (1968).
153. See Heffron v. ISKCON, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 655 (1981) (state fair designated
a "limited public forum").
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rum 5 4 and upheld when the airport is found to be a limited public
forum. 155 Reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on the exer6
cise of first amendment activities at a public forum are permissible. 15
Accordingly, courts invalidate ordinances which unreasonably regulate religious solicitation at "public forum" airports. Many of the
invalidated ordinances have been struck down because they vest ad5 7
ministrative officials with excessive discretion.1
A court may be willing to limit the public forum areas of an airport
in light of the airport's need to maintain crowd control and monitor
security. In ISKCON, Inc. v. Rochford, 158 the court permitted the
airport regulations to proscribe solicitation in those public areas in
which airport officials are concerned about security problems, 59 captive audience problems 16 0 or space limitations. 1 1 The court asserted
that the city's concerns in facilitating the processing of travelers, the
flow of traffic and routine airport activities were valid, and that
exclusion of first amendment activities from these areas was proper. 162
154. See Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 626 (5th Cir. 1981) (refers to
airport as public place and public forum), cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 5 (1982);
ISKCON, Inc. v. Wolke, 453 F. Supp. 869, 872 (E.D. Wis. 1978); ISKCON, Inc. v.
Engelhardt, 425 F. Supp. 176, 180 (D. Kan. 1977).
According to the court in Wolke, areas of an airport terminal which are generally
open to the public are a public forum. 453 F. Supp. at 872. The airport's crowded
conditions were insufficient support for the prohibition of free speech which would
have resulted if the court had found that the airport was not a public forum. Id. at
874.
Similarly, in Engelhardt, the court found that those portions of the airport which
are open to the general public are a protected first amendment forum, despite the
fact that the city holds the airport in a proprietary capacity. 425 F. Supp. at 180. The
court rejected the defendant's contention that the airport's unusual characteristics
made it less of a public forum. Id. at 180 n.5.
155. See ISKCON of Atlanta v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809, 828 (5th Cir. 1979) (ordinance could limit solicitation to five areas of airport and could limit the transfer of
money to booths, since it substantially contributed to goal of reduced disruption);
ISKCON, Inc. v. Rochford, 585 F.2d 263, 268 (7th Cir. 1978) (certain public areas
proscribed because of airport officials' concern with security, travelers and space
limitations).
156. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
157. See Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 629 (5th Cir. 1981) (board had
unguided power to grant or deny applicant permit based on its opinion as to organization's legitimacy), cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 5 (1982); ISKCON, Inc. v. Wolke,
453 F. Supp. 869, 874 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (no standards for decision-making);
ISKCON, Inc. v. Engelhardt, 425 F. Supp. 176, 180 (D. Kan. 1977) (ordinance
prescribed no standards to limit licensing authority's discretion).
158. 585 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1978).
159. Id. at 268 (airport security must be most tightly controlled in hijack, search
and security areas).
160. Id. (captive audience problems arise when people are waiting in line).
161. Id. (space limited in doorways and on escalators).
162. Id. at 268-69. According to the court, the city's valid concerns were "to
expedite the processing of travelers, to maintain a free and orderly flow of traffic,
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Similarly, the ordinance in ISKCON of Atlanta v. Eaves, 16 3 which
imposed substantial limitations on solicitors' use of the airport as a
public forum, also was upheld. Solicitation was restricted to five areas
of the airport, and money had to be exchanged from within solicitation booths. 16 4 According to the court, the limitations imposed by the
ordinance were not overly burdensome 16 5 and were justified by their
"substantial contribution to . . . fairness, ease of enforcement, and
reduced disruption" at the airport. 6 6
B. State Fairs
Regulations which restrict solicitation activity to booths have come
to be known as booth solicitation rules. While a few airports have
booth solicitation rules, these rules generally are used to regulate
solicitation at state fairs. 167 Booth solicitation rules are of two types:
those which confine all activities of the solicitor to a booth, 168 and
those which require that only the solicitation activity be conducted
from within the booth. 6 9 It is arguable that the two types of booth
and to avoid disruption of normal airport activities." Id. In addition, the remaining
areas of the airport in which ISKCON could exercise its first amendment rights were
not insubstantial. Id. at 269. The court rejected the city's suggestion that, even if it
were denied use of airport facilities, ISKCON could present its views anywhere else
in Chicago. Id. at 272.
163. 601 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1979).
164. Id. at 816-17. For a discussion of booth solicitation rules, see notes 167-70
infra and accompanying text.
165. The court did not address the five area restriction. Instead, the court noted
that "appellants can ask for funds or attempt to sell religious tracts at any place in the
airport where they are allowed to proselytize; the ordinance requires only that
instead of accepting any proffered money, they refer the donor to a solicitation
booth." 601 F.2d at 828-29.
166. Id. at 830. The court followed a novel approach in reaching the conclusion
that the ordinance was not vague. Since the ordinance would be repeatedly applied
by a small number of enforcement officials to the limited number of people licensed
to proselytize at the airport, the court felt that "certain patterns of enforcement and
tacit understandings..." would develop, and that the ordinance could therefore be
permitted to be somewhat imprecise. Id. at 831.
167. For examples of cases involving state fairs which regulate religious solicitation through booth solicitation rules, see, e.g., Heffron v. ISKCON, Inc., 452 U.S.
640 (1981); Hynes v. Metropolitan Gov't, 667 F.2d 549 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam);
Edwards v. Maryland State Fair & Agricultural Soc'y, Inc., 628 F.2d 282 (4th Cir.
1980); ISKCON v. Bowen, 600 F.2d 667 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963
(1979); ISKCON v. State Fair of Tex., 480 F. Supp. 67 (N.D. Tex. 1979); ISKCON,
Inc. v. Evans, 440 F. Supp. 414 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
168. See ISKCON, Inc. v. Bowen, 600 F.2d 667 (7th Cir.) (state fair officials
required members of ISKCON to practice Sankirtan from a booth), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 963 (1979); ISKCON v. State Fair of Tex., 480 F. Supp. 67 (N.D. Tex. 1979)
(state fair sought to confine plaintiffs to booth for all activities).
169. See ISKCON, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1981) (booth rule
restricted solicitation of funds to leased booths); Edwards v. Maryland State Fair &
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solicitation rules are effectively the same, as both are likely to restrict
donations. Solicitors either will decide to stay within the booths for
other activities as well, or they will have to return to the booth-and
convince the donor to return with them-for the purpose of accepting
170
donations.
Despite wide criticism of booth rules' 71 the Supreme Court, in
Heffron v. ISKCON, Inc., 172 has insured, at least temporarily, the
validity of booth solicitation rules at state fairs and the status of the
state fair as a limited public forum. This result stems from the Court's
unwillingness to equate a fair with a public street 173 and its validation
of a state fair's booth rule. 174 Prior to Heffron, courts exempted
ISKCON from the booth solicitation rule's coverage175 and found that
the states were without sufficient justification for confining ISKCON
76
devotees to booths.
C. Other Tourist Attractions
In evaluating regulation of religious solicitation at tourist attractions other than state fairs, lower courts have not been hesitant to
limit and even curtail solicitors' access to a forum when the forum's
special characteristics warrant such restriction.

Agricultural Soc'y, Inc., 628 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1980) (those wishing to solicit
contributions, sell products, or distribute literature required to do so from a booth);
ISKCON, Inc. v. Evans, 440 F. Supp. 414 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (regulation required all
solicitations to be made from within a booth).
170. For an example of the contention that booth solicitation rules will discourage
contributions, see ISKCON of W. Pa., Inc. v. Griffin, 437 F. Supp. 666, 673 (W.D.
Pa. 1977).
171. See notes 65-66 supra and accompanying text.
172. 452 U.S. 640 (1981). For a discussion of Heffron, see notes 57-66 supra and
accompanying text.
173. 452 U.S. at 651.
174. Id. at 655. Only one of Hefjron'slower court predecessors had been willing to
similarly limit the availability of a state fair as a public forum. See ISKCON, Inc. v.
Evans, 440 F. Supp. 414, 425 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (fair not constitutional equivalent of
park or street corner).
175. See, e.g., ISKCON v. State Fair of Tex., 480 F. Supp. 67, 68 (N.D. Tex.
1979) (ISKCON alone exempted from defendants' booth solicitation rule, because
other vendors' interest in free speech not on parity with ISKCON's).
176. See Edwards v. Maryland State Fair & Agricultural Soc'y, Inc., 628 F.2d
282, 286-87 (4th Cir. 1980) (court unconvinced that crowd control was compelling
state interest or that there were no less restrictive means by which it could be
accomplished); ISKCON, Inc. v. Bowen, 600 F.2d 667, 669-70 (7th Cir.) (interest in
combating fraud could be accomplished by less restrictive regulation, and plaintiffs'
production of litter and interference with concessionaires' business was insufficient
justification for restrictions), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979).
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The court in ISKCON, Inc. v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition
Authority 77 was impressed with the Authority's unique concerns regarding its Meadowlands racetrack. The large number of race track
patrons presented strong safety considerations, as well as enhanced
risks of misrepresentation and fraud. 78 In addition, the court distinguished between " 'forum' like locations," such as city streets and
parks and "other" facilities, such as fairs, subway stations, airports,
and convention centers, 79 in reaching the conclusion that the Authority's policy of forbidding solicitation was warranted.180
The regulations which were at issue in ISKCON,Inc. v. McAvey 18'
did not forbid solicitation at the World Trade Center in New York
City, but rather limited the number of ISKCON devotees who could
practice Sankirtan i8 2 in the center, as well as the times and places
where it could be practiced. 8 3 The court upheld the regulations,
stating that the plaintiffs had ample access to the forum despite the
regulations, which kept solicitors from causing added confusion in the
most congested areas of the center. 84 Similarly, the plantiffs in Liberman v. Schesventer 8 5 had ample access to the Castillo de San Marcos
National Monument in Florida,186 despite a regulation which permitted certain areas of national parks to be designated as unavailable for
solicitation.187 In Liberman, the court upheld the regulation because
177. 532 F. Supp. 1088 (D.N.J. 1981)., aff'd mem., 691 F.2d 155 (1982).
178. Id.at 1104.
179. Id.at 1103.
180. Id.at 1106. In addition, the court was unable to distinguish between religious and nonreligious solicitors, so that, according to the court, if the Authority
were opened up to the plaintiffs, it would have to be opened up to other groups as
well. Id. at 1105.
181. 450 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
182. For a discussion of the ISKCON ritual of Sankirtan, see note 5 supra and
accompanying text.
183. 450 F. Supp. at 1266. The regulations restrict solicitors to 10 areas of the
World Trade Center, requiring solicitors to remain at least 15 feet away from
designated areas. Since only one ISKCON devotee is permitted to practice Sankirtan
within each of the 10 specified areas, a maximum of 10 devotees can be present in the
World Trade Center. In addition, the regulations restrict devotees to practicing
Sankirtan from 9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. on weekdays and from 10:00 a.m. to 5:00
p.m. on weekends. Id. at 1268.
184. Id. at 1270. These areas include subway entrances, intersections, and highly
trafficked corridors which are divided by columns. Id.
185. 447 F. Supp. 1355 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
186. Id. at 1360.
187. Id. at 1357. Areas were designated as unavailable if solicitation would "(1)
cause injury or damage to park resources; or (2) unreasonably impair the atmosphere
of peace and tranquility maintained in wilderness, natural, historic or commemorative areas; or (3) unreasonably interfere with interpretive, living history, visitors
services, or other program activities or with the administrative functions of the
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it permitted the plaintiffs to exercise first amendment rights and the
government to maintain the atmosphere of the monument.18
In ISKCON v. City of New York, 8 " a New York City Police Department policy barred the plaintiffs from proselytizing and soliciting
in a specific area of the United Nations Headquarters. 90 The District
Court for the Southern District of New York noted New York City's
"particularly weighty obligations" respecting the security of
the
United Nations Headquarters, 9 ' including the fact that the area at
issue in the case was "fraught with security problems." 192 Since alternative forums were available, 19 3 the court held that the government's
interest in protecting the United Nations Headquarters outweighed
the limitations which the police department's policy placed on the
forum. 194
national park service; or (4) substantially impair the operation of public use facilities
or services of national park service concessioners or contractors." Id.
188. Id. at 1361.
189. Two actions were involved in this case. In the first action, the court denied
the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. 484 F. Supp. 966 (S.D.N.Y.
1979). The second action resulted in a bench trial, at which the court determined
that a proper balance had been attained between the conflicting interests presented
in the case. 501 F. Supp. 684, 693 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
190. The policy affects the sidewalks immediately adjacent to the Visitors' Gate.
When the first action was brought, the east side of First Avenue between 45th and
46th Streets was affected. 484 F. Supp. at 967. By the time the second action was
brought, the restricted area had been increased from between 45th and 46th Streets
to between 42nd and 48th Streets. 501 F. Supp. at 686.
191. 484 F. Supp. at 971.
192. 501 F. Supp. at 693. The Visitors' Gate is the site of heavy pedestrian and
vehicular traffic. Id. at 688. Police regularly have to deal with thousands of demonstrators and picketers at the United Nations Headquarters. Id. at 689. If the police
are permitted to exclude all continuous presences from the east side of First Avenue,
they can easily tell whether anyone is attempting to scale the fence which surrounds
the United Nations Headquarters or to throw objects onto the property. Id. at 688,
693.
193. Id. at 689. According to the court, the plaintiffs may continue to practice
Sankirtan at the United Nations Headquarters itself, as long as the devotees stay
away from the small area which is restricted by the Police Department's policy. The
Police Department has designated six areas as recommended for demonstrating and
picketing, and has indicated that practically the only place it would object to
plaintiffs' presence is in the area restricted by the policy. Id. at 686-87. Thus, the
policy preserves the plaintiffs' access to the audience of United Nations Headquarters
visitors, which plaintiffs seek because of their international character and receptivity.
Id. at 693-94.
194. Id. at 693. In reaching its conclusion, the court reviewed the unusual nature
of the United Nations Headquarters and the activities which are carried on there. Id.
In addition, the court noted that it was considering only this particular policy of the
New York City Police Department, and was not holding that the police could
constitutionally prohibit plaintiffs' practicing Sankirtan elsewhere. Id. at 694. Although the court also noted that an unwritten policy such as the Police Department's
might result in discretionary decisionmaking, it found no evidence that such discretion had been exercised. Id. at 687 n.4.
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D. The "Flexible Forum"
A court's characterization of a forum will not necesarily be static.
9 5 the plantiffs sought to enjoin enforcement
In ISKCON v. Schrader'
of an ordinance which barred soliciting in a city convention center
while it was leased to a private tenant. 9 6 The court found that a
197
forum's characterization did not necessarily have to be permanent.
Each tenant's use of the center would determine whether ISKCON
would be permitted to have access to the inside of the center.'9 8
Although ISKCON claimed that if it were denied access to the inside
of the center it would be without alternative access to the forum, the
court dismissed the claim, asserting that the sidewalks outside the
99
center would nevertheless remain available to ISKCON.1
Thus, the characterization of a forum will determine whether religious solicitors will have access to it. As urban centers become increasingly complex, courts may be more willing to limit public forums and
consequently uphold more restrictions on the regulation of religious
solicitation.
V. Proposal For Model Ordinance
While it has long been established that municipalities may regulate
religious solicitation, 20 0 the permissible boundaries of these regulations
have never been clearly mapped out by the courts. Rather, courts
have established what is impermissible.
195. 461 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
196. Id. at 715. While the center was leased to private tenants, the city maintained control over all of the center's interior corridors. Id. at 716.
197. Id. at 718. When a tenant's use of the center failed to render it a public
forum, ISKCON could be denied access, regardless of "the state's role as land" Id. at 719. One example of a use which would fail to render the forum
lord ..
public was a convention of dental supply technicians. Id. at 718.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976) (municipality's power to
regulate in order to protect citizens from crime and undue annoyance has been
consistently recognized by the Supreme Court); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105, 116 (1943) (state regulation of the streets is permissible to protect the community
from "the evils of solicitations"); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940)
(regulation of solicitation not constitutionally objectionable if it is in the public
interest, does not involve any religious test, and does not unreasonably obstruct or
delay the collection of funds); ISKCON v. City of New York, 484 F. Supp. 966
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (government may reasonably restrict time, place and manner of
exercising first amendment rights); Westfall v. Board of Comm'rs, 477 F. Supp. 862
(N.D. Ga. 1979) (reasonable restrictions upon time, place and manner of first
amendment rights may unquestionably be imposed); Weissman v. City of Alamogordo, 472 F. Supp. 425 (D.N.M. 1979) (municipality's power to enforce reasonable
requirements to protect its citizens is well recognized).
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An ordinance which regulates religious solicitation may be constitutionally impermissible if it lacks the necessary Freedman procedural
safeguards, 2 0 ' or if it requires the payment of a flat license tax as a
condition of the exercise of first amendment activities. 202 However,
solicitors may be required to pay a nominal licensing fee, if it is aimed
at defraying the cost of policing solicitation activities. 203 Ordinances
may not be overly burdensome to those who are regulated by them,2 0 4
nor may they act as a prior restraint upon religious solicitation. 205
Such regulations may not contain absolute prohibitions or broad re-

201. See notes 143-47 supra and accompanying text. Freedman is invoked when
an ordinance permits the exercise of administrative discretion. See Fernandes v.
Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 628 (5th Cir. 1981) (Board's opinion as to legitimacy of
applicant's organization was unguided), cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 5 (1982); Conlon
v. City of N. Kansas City, Mo., 530 F. Supp. 985, 990 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (ordinance
vested discretion to grant or deny solicitation certificates in city officials); United
States v. Silberman, 464 F. Supp. 866, 874 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (ordinance lacked
objective criteria); ISKCON of Berkeley, Inc. v. Kearnes, 454 F. Supp. 116, 124
(E.D. Cal. 1978) (limitations on criteria for obtaining permit necessary to protect
against administrative officials' arbitrary denial); ISKCON of W. Pa., Inc. v. Griffin, 437 F. Supp. 666, 672 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (ordinance prompted director of aviation's application of personal notion of public interest). Section 4 of the model
ordinance proposed in § V of this Comment, inJra, is meant to be completely
ministerial, with no discretion vested in the administrative official. Thus, Freedman
procedural safeguards are not a necessity.
202. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). See also Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 633 (5th Cir. 1981) (an ordinance should not impose an exaction,
even one that is moderate in amount, on the privilege of using a public forum for a
constitutionally protected purpose, unless the governmental body demonstrates a link
between the fee and the costs of the licensing process), cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 5
(1982); Troyer v. Town of Babylon, 483 F. Supp. 1135, 1139 (E.D.N.Y.) (requirement that people from out of town secure consent from homeowners before approaching homes to solicit was "an indirect unconstitutional imposition of a licensing
fee"), aJJ'd, 628 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), afJ'd sub nom. Town of Southampton v.
Troyer, 449 U.S. 988 (1980); ISKCON of Western Pa., Inc. v. Griffin, 437 F. Supp.
666, 670 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (ordinance's imposition of $10 per day fee was void);
ISKCON v. Conlisk, 374 F. Supp. 1010, 1016 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (licensing fee
amounted to a taxing measure).
203. It is permissible to use a licensing fee to defray administrative costs if the
governmental body can demonstrate a link between the fee and the costs of the
licensing process. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 113-14 (1943);
Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 633 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct.
5 (1982). See also ISKCON, Inc. v. Evans, 440 F. Supp. 414, 422 (S.D. Ohio 1977)
(fee charged for rental of booth space not constitutionally improper, because meant
to defray expenses of exhibitors' activities).
204. See Westfall v. Board of Comm'rs, 477 F. Supp. 862, 867 (N.D. Ga. 1979)
(ordinance which impermissibly required extensive identification procedures necessitated that a "double dose" of certain information be administered).
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strictions. 20 ' The state's interest in the prevention of fraud is not
20 7
sufficient to justify these types of regulation of religious solicitation.
Ordinances seem to be invalidated most often on the basis of the
court's assessment that the ordinances give too much administrative
control to the governmental officials. 208 Courts advise that a licensing
authority must be guided by narrow, objective, and definite standards 209 and that an ordinance must "sufficiently specify what those
within its reach must do in order to comply." 210 Yet, courts have not
set forth definitive standards.
205. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975)
(public officials may not be given "the power to deny use of a forum in advance of
actual expression"); ISKCON of Atlanta v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809, 832 (5th Cir. 1979)
(automatically revoking the permit of anyone who violated the ordinance and revoking all permits issued on behalf of an organization if three or more convictions
representing the same organization occurred within six months was "simply a recipe
for an unlawful prior restraint"); ISKCON of Berkeley, Inc. v. Kearnes, 454 F. Supp.
116, 124 (E.D. Cal. 1978) (ordinances which regulated content of speech by denying
permits to those "likely" to engage in fraudulent behavior operated as prior restraint
on exercise of speech).
206. See McMurdie v. Doutt, 468 F. Supp. 766, 775 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (unlawful
for mayor to completely cut off Unification Church's first amendment right to secure
permits); ISKCON v. Conlisk, 374 F. Supp. 1010, 1017 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (arbitrary
infringement on exercise of first amendment rights to limit solicitation to one day per
year).
207. For a list of cases in which courts have sought to justify regulations by an
interest in preventing fraud, see note 120 supra and accompanying text.
208. See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293 (1951) (administrative official may
not be given power to control citizens' right to speak about religion); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940) (grant of license to conduct religious solicitation may not be conditioned upon state's determination of whether or not a cause is
religious); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163-64 (1939) (applicant may not be
required to submit evidence for police officer's judgment); Conlon v. City of N.
Kansas City, Mo., 530 F. Supp. 985, 989-90 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (impermissible to
grant city officials unfettered discretion); Walker v. Wegner, 477 F. Supp. 648, 653
(D.S.D. 1979) (exercise of administrative discretion should be precluded by statutes
which regulate religious solicitation); Weissman v. City of Alamogordo, 472 F. Supp.
425, 430 (D.N.M. 1979) (unconstitutional to condition freedom of speech upon
municipal officials' discretion); McMurdie v. Doutt, 468 F. Supp. 766, 776 (N.D.
Ohio 1979) (mayor may not exercise unbridled authority in granting or denying
solicitation permits); ISKCON, Inc., v. Lentini, 461 F. Supp. 49, 53 (E.D. La. 1978)
(unfettered discretion impermissible); Swearson v. Meyers, 455 F. Supp. 88, 92 (D.
Kan. 1978) (ordinance may not call for city officials' exercise of discretion);
ISKCON, Inc. v. Engelhardt, 425 F. Supp. 176, 180 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (licensing
authority's discretion may not be unlimited).
209. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969); Conlon
v. City of N. Kansas City, Mo., 530 F. Supp. 985, 990 (W.D. Mo. 1981); Sylte v.
Metropolitan Gov't, 493 F. Supp. 313, 319 (M.D. Tenn. 1980) (per curiam); United
States v. Silberman, 464 F. Supp. 866, 873 (M.D. Fla. 1979); ISKCON, Inc. v.
Wolke, 453 F. Supp. 869, 874 (E.D. Wis. 1978); ISKCON, Inc. v. Hays, 438 F.
Supp. 1077, 1081 (S.D. Fla. 1977); ISKCON of W. Pa., Inc. v. Griffin, 436 F. Supp.
666, 671 (W.D. Pa. 1977); ISKCON, Inc. v. Rochford, 425 F. Supp. 734, 742 (N.D.
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Once a court determines that an ordinance vests too much discretion in a governmental official, the court seldom evaluates the ordinance any further. Thus, municipalities have only the extremely
broad reasonable time, place and manner standard2 1 1 upon which to
fashion their ordinances-a standard which, because it is so broad,
easily may result in discriminatory treatment of controversial religious
groups. 21 A solicitor may also be required to meet precise registration
requirements, 213 as long as they do not vest discretion-especially
discretion to determine the validity of a religion-in municipal employees.21 4 Since courts themselves have sometimes required solicitors
to wear identification cards,2 1 5 such a requirement in a municipal
ordinance would probably pass constitutional muster. 216 It is permissi-

Ill. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 585 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1978). See also Greene
v. Sinclair, 491 F. Supp. 19, 23 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (necessity of clear, definite, and
objective standards). Since § 4(a) of the model ordinance proposed in § V of this
Comment, infra, vests the administrative official with no discretion, these standards
are not required.
210. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 621 (1976). See §§ 2-3 of the model
ordinance proposed in § V of this Comment, infra.
211. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
212. See notes 53-56 and 105-08 supra and accompanying text.
213. See note 216 injra and accompanying text. See also § 3 of the model ordinance proposed in § V of this Comment, infra.
214. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
215. See note 126 supra and accompanying text.
216. "Without doubt a State may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation
by requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit
funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause
which he purports to represent." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940).
See also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (permissible for ordinance to
require solicitors to identify themselves, so that authorities have basis for investigating strangers); Weissman v. City of Alamogordo, 472 F. Supp. 425, 430 (D.N.M.
1979) (language indicating that ordinance may require stranger to establish identity
and authority); McMurdie v. Doutt, 468 F. Supp. 766, 776 (N.D. Ohio 1979)
(solicitors may be required to establish identity); ISKCON of Berkeley, Inc. v.
Kearnes, 454 F. Supp. 116, 124 (E.D. Cal. 1978) (constitutional for state to require
solicitors to identify themselves to government officials). The court in Westfall v.
Board of Comm'rs, 477 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. Ga. 1979), objected to the identification
card provision of the ordinance, apparently because the ordinance required additionally that the cards be read, and that a further verbal explanation be provided. Id. at
867.
However, there is some opposition to identification badges. Both ISKCON, Inc. v.
Lentini, 461 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. La. 1978) and ISKCON of Houston, Inc. v. City of
Houston, 482 F. Supp. 852 (S.D. Tex. 1979), rev'd, 689 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1982) cite
Wulp v. Corcoran, 454 F.2d 826 (1st Cir. 1972) (ordinance requiring newspaper
vendors to wear official badge invalidated) and Strasser v. Doorley, 432 F.2d 567 (1st
Cir. 1970) (unconstitutional for bootblacks and newsboys to be required to wear
numbered metal badges on their hats) as support for the contention that solicitors
cannot be required to wear identifying badges. ISKCON, Inc. v. Lentini, 461 F.

1983]

RELIGIOUS SOLICITATION

ble to limit door-to-door solicitation to daylight hours, 217 and to require public disclosure of organizational finances, 218 so that individuals' decisions as to whether they wish to contribute to certain
organizations may be more informed.219 Finally, it has been held that
an ordinance may exempt those organizations which solicit solely
220
from their own members.
Based on the foregoing criteria, the following model ordinance
should survive judicial scrutiny.
MODEL ORDINANCE: MUNICIPAL REGULATION OF
SOLICITATION FOR CHARITABLE, RELIGIOUS, OR
EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES
NOTE: For any ordinance which regulates charitable, religious, and
educational solicitation to be constitutional, commercial and political
solicitation must be at least as strictly regulated.
§ 1. "Soliciting" means
(a) requesting the present or future donation of something of value,
or
(b) selling or offering to sell property and to use the proceeds for a
charitable, religious or educational purpose.
§ 2. General Rules.
(a) Registration certificates must be obtained before soliciting for
charitable, religious or educational purposes, will be permitted.
(b) To obtain a registration certificate, a registration statement
must be submitted.
(c) While soliciting for charitable, religious or educational purposes, individuals must visibly display identification cards.
Supp. at 53; ISKCON of Houston, Inc. v. City of Houston, 482 F. Supp. at 865. See §
2(c) & § 5 of the model ordinance proposed in § V of this Comment, infra.
217. Westfall v. Board of Comm'rs, 477 F. Supp. 862, 871 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
Originally, the court did not object to the fact that defendants had placed this time
limitation upon all of plaintiffs' solicitation activity. On reconsideration, however,
the court decided that a distinction had to be made between soliciting in public areas
and soliciting from house to house, and that the time restriction should only be
applicable to the latter. Id. at 865. See § 2(d) of the model ordinance proposed in § V
of this Comment, infra.
218. See § 6(c)(ii) of the model ordinance proposed in § V of this Comment, inJra.
219. See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 63738 (1980).
220. See ISKCON of Houston, Inc. v. City of Houston, 689 F.2d 541, 553 (5th
Cir. 1982) (exception just reduces burden of registration when compliance with
ordinance would be inappropriate); National Found. v. City of Fort Worth, 415
F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1969) (considerations of such organizations different from those of
other solicitors), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970). See also § 7 of the model
ordinance proposed in § V of this Comment, infra.

878

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XI

(d) Soliciting from house to house between the hours of 10:00 p.m.
and 6:00 a.m. is prohibited.
§ 3. Registration Statement.
(a) Statement must be filed on form provided by the city, and must
be signed and acknowledged by the individual who is authorized to disburse the proceeds of the solicitation.
(b) Payment of a five dollar ($5.00) fee is required for the city to
process the registration statement.
(c) Statement must provide the following information:
(i) name, mailing address and telephone number of the individual authorized to disburse the proceeds of the solicitation, and
(A) if the registrant is a natural person, his/her business or
residential address and corresponding telephone number
(B) if the registrant is a partnership, the name, principal business address and telephone number of each partner
(C) if the registrant is a corporation, its mailing address and
telephone number, and the name of the individual in
charge of the city office
(D) if the registrant is an association, its principle business
address and telephone number or the principle business or
residential addresses and corresponding telephone numbers of its officers
(ii) Brief description of charitable or religious purpose, means of
accomplishing solicitation, and intended use of solicitation
NOTE: Soliciting for a charitable or religious purpose other
than that set forth in the registration statement is prohibited.
(iii) time period of solicitation, from beginning date to projected
date of conclusion
(iv) if anyone connected with the solicitation has been convicted
of a crime within the past seven (7) years, name of such
individual(s), offense, state in which conviction occurred,
and year of conviction.
§ 4. Registration Certificate.
(a) Within ten (10) working days after the registration statement
has been filed, the city shall either issue a registration certificate
or shall notify the registrant as to the information which was
missing and which is required before a registration certificate
will issue.
(b) Solicitors may not misrepresent registration certificates as endorsements by the city.
§ 5. Identification Cards.
(a) Registrant must provide list of names and address of all solicitors desiring identification cards.
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(b) To obtain more than ten (10) identification cards with the
registration certificate, the registrant must pay the city the
actual cost of issuing the cards.
(c) Identification cards shall bear name of registrant, name of individual solicitor and expiration date.
(d) Identification cards may not be altered, transferred or misrepresented as an endorsement by the city.
§ 6. Expiration.
(a) Registration certificates and identification cards expire on the
date projected as the conclusion of the solicitation period or one
(1) year from the date of their issuance, whichever is less.
(b) Solicitation is prohibited once the registration certificate has
expired.
(c) Within thirty (30) days after the registration certificate has
expired, the individual authorized to disburse the proceeds of
the solicitation shall file a sworn closing statement with the city.
(i) The city shall provide a standardized form for the closing
statement.
(ii) The statement shall show the cost of the solicitation and the
total funds collected.
§ 7. Exceptions.
Compliance with this ordinance is not required when an organization or association solicits
(a) from its own members, or
(b) on premises which it owns or controls.
§ 8. Penalty. The penalty for violating an ordinance such as this
might be a fine and/or a criminal sanction for repeat offenders.
A discussion of permissible penalties is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
§ 9. Severability. All provisions of this ordinance are severable from
each other.
VI. Conclusion
Conflict between municipal protection of citizens' interests and free
expression of religious solicitors is inevitable. As long as municipalities
attempt to regulate religious solicitation, courts will have to balance
governmental interests against religious solicitors' constitutional
rights. To achieve this difficult balance, courts must continue to
evaluate the constitutional validity of statutes. Thus, legislators can
act in the best interests of both governmental entities and religious
groups by drafting neutral regulations which further government interests while zealously safeguarding constitutional guarantees.
Audrey Peltz

